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BOOK REVIEW
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. Eighth Edition, 1952. By Giorgio Del Vecchio. Trans-

lated by Thomas Owen Martin. Washington: The Catholic University of
America Press, 1953. Pp. xxiv, 474.
By Giorgio Del Vecchio. Translated by Felix
Forte. Introduction by Roscoe Pound. Boston: Boston University Press, 1956.
Pp. Y, 111.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW.

Before entering a discussion on the two books, this reviewer is compelled to
confess that the impression that he himself is to blame for the delay in reviewing
the first-mentioned book is correct. However, much as he deplores the fact, he
was given the chance by such a delay to combine with an evaluation of the
Philosophy of Law the reading of the General Principles. This latter book
facilitates and supplements a full understanding of the illustrious author's philosophy of law.
I
In his volume, Philosophy of Law, the author separates a very short
"Introduction" and a substantial "History of Philosophy of Law" from a
"Systematic Treatise" on the theory of law. The "Treatise" and the "History"
each embrace approximately half of the volume. Thus, in treating as large a
subject as the history of philosophy of law in- two hundred twenty pages it was
inevitable that the author had to be rather selective in his treatment of the great
thinkers and schools. Modern representatives of legal philosophy except John
Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer are little more than mentioned. The more
detailed treatment of the Italians therefore constitutes an exception. Although
the substantial part of the "Treatise" deals analytically with the concept of law,
and is concerned with the formal approach to law and not with the evaluation of
its content, John Austin and his works appear only as names (p. 200). Austin's
approach is not directly opposed to the author's.
The treatment of the theory of law is more detailed. In its first section this
part of the book deals, if I might mention only the more important topics, with
the concept of law, the relations between law and morals, and the concepts of
law in the objective sense with respect to subjective rights. In addition, there is
a discussion on the sources of law, of society in general and the State in particular,
and finally of the relations between Law and State. The second section is devoted
to a critical-historical investigation into the origin and evolution of law. It is
followed in the last (third) section by an examination of the concept of justice
in various theories. These theories are, on the one hand, the skeptical and
empirical-historical doctrines which deny an absolute concept of justice and, on
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the other hand, their opposites such as the theological ones. A subsection attempts
to further our insight into the theory of Utilitarianism. The book concludes with
the author's approach to a metaphysical or teleological conception (in contrast to
a me.-ly causal conception) of nature, particularly the nature of man. The author
believes that such a conception "permits us to perceive and evaluate the most
profound and intimate harmonies in the order of reality and in the development of
its manifestations." He rejects the idea of determinism since human actions
cannot be adjudged as natural phenorena which, as such, baffle any evaluating
judgment. In contrast, the idea of liberty is looked upon by the author as the
fundamental basis; for "the very law of causality emanates from the consciousness,
the absolute primacy of the ego." In other words, man is an "autonomous being,"
able to perceive and also to evaluate the intimate harmonies in the order of
reality.
The Kantian influence upon Del Vecchio's philosophy can be seen particularly
also in his theory of law as it is presented in the first section of the "Systematic
Treatise." Kant had emphasized the external character of the actions to which
law refers. The author admits that law refers only to "actions," but for him the
internal side of an action must not be overlooked. This term is used by him to
point to the moment of "will"; he means the motives out of which an external
action is put into operation. We might ask whether motives ar6 essential to the
idea of law as such. In my view, Kant's approach, an approach which in this part
of the world coincides with that of Oliver Weiidell Holmes, is correct. For Kant,
and, perhaps independently of him, for Holmes, motives have significance in the
forum of the law only as far as the law takes cognizance of them.
For the author, an ethical principle translates itself in a double order of
evaluation, a moral and a legal one. However, this attempt to find a major
concept to include both moral and legal rules, lacks convincing argumentation. On
the one hand the author adopts the Kantian differentiation between legal and
moral norms and, therefore, between legal and moral duties. With regard to the
principles of morality the author admits (p. 264) that "the selection of the act
to be accomplished and the exclusion of those others (actions) which would be
physically possible" is left to the individual alone which means that such selection
depends on his own moral evaluation. This power of the individual to choose, so
strongly presented by Kant, is called by Del Vecchio the subjective consideration
of operation.
On the other hand, if we turn to the legal side, we find that the test for the
"incompatibility between action and action" is not an inner, subjective, moral
evaluation. It is the objective norms, imposed by others, that are the competent
authority which directs an individual's action. These norms are quite independent
of the individual's inclination to.follow them.
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But Dr. Del Vecchio looks at both morality and law as emanations of an
ethical principle, that is, a system of coherent norms, deduced from that principle.
Naturally he cannot deny that there might be a discrepancy between moral and
legal duties. He calls such a situation a confusion between different ethical
systems. Accordingly, there are two different systems. I do not believe that by
calling them by the same name ("ethical") their subordination to one major
category can be proven.
However, Del Vecchio's attitude is consistent with his fundamental theory
of law. He emphasizes that the "notion of law" is a universal or unitary one
which can be understood as a formal concept only. The formal nature of the
concept is contrasted to the content. By this approach the content, necessarily being
joined always with the form, supplies only "a contingent and accidental element"
(p. 252). Consequently, "the content of juridical reality cannot serve as a basis
for a differentiation of law." (p. 250) This may explain his rejection of the
idea of natural law as a universal; because an ideal law, as in his view natural
law is, constitutes, as he says, a system of law which must be placed alongside of
other systems of law which exist. (p. 248) Also such an ideal law is a
determination of justice whereas, according to the author's doctrine, law as a
universal can be only a formal, merely logical, concept which "does not tell us
at all what is the meaning of any affirmation of just or unjust." (p. 251) As a
result, the significance of law as a "universal" lies in its supplying merely the
possibility of evaluation. The evaluation itself can be found only in a particular
legal system.
Now we have reached the point at which we can understand why the
formal definition of law gave rise to the author's formulation of an ethicil
principle from which *the legal norms as well as the moral norms are deduced.
From the standpoint of pure logic little objection can be raised against this
doctrine. However, on the one hand the evaluation itself must be interpreted,
as we have seen, in terms of each particular legal system. On the other hand, the
author himself considers, in Hegelian fashion, a legal system as a product of a
continuous development of ideas which, however progressing, operate, with
varying contents, differently in various societies.
I fear that such an abstract definition of law would leave the determination of
the objectives aimed at by the law-giver completely to the latter. Neither Kant's
universal of law, based on freedom, nor Stammler's "just law" or Bentham's
"greatest good of the greatest number"--to mention only a few important
doctrines which do not eliminate certain references to aims and, ends-would
supply any test for the "juridicity" in the sense given to it by the author.
It was perhaps this apprehension of the boundlessness inherent in his
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definition of law which motivated the author to eliminate from the definition
of that universal, any reference to the State as law giver. Later on we find
expressions and discussions concerning the State and its relation to Law. Thus,
it is s ;c.
that the State is the "center of the juridical arrangement" (p. 295), that
"the law emanates from the State" (p. 341), and that the "state is the subject
of that arrangement." (p. 345). True, at the last mentioned page the author
adds the words "in a positively constituted juridical order." But, we may ask
whether any legal order could be imagiaed without the State.' On p. 359 we find
the remark that "the State exists essentially in the juridical order," a statement
which is followed on p. 371 by the definition of the State as "only an ideal point
of convergence to which must be referred all the juridical determinations which
pertain to a system." To a student of analytical jurisprudence this sounds like the
reasoning of the Pure Theory of Law, particularly Hans Kelsen's conception of
the State as the personification of the legal order constituting a legal community.
If, as the author admits, the State is the "subject of the juridical order," that
is, the entity from which "the command, an imperative which the law always
implies, emanates," then, we have to ascribe to that entity that which is called
"sovereignty". It seems to this reviewer that the author in denying sovereignty
(in the juridical sense) to all legal communities does not explain why the
regulation of a primitive community is devoid of the equality of law. The
requirements listed by the author for statehood are those established in the
present international law. It is one thing to astribe sovereignty to every community regulating the life of its members (see Maine's Early History of Institutions
382 (7th ed.), and it is an entirely different matter not to regard every legal
order constituting a legal community, particularly a primitive one, as a State.
(See Kelsen's Principles of InternationalLaw, p. 101).
Naturally, in such a short space as is granted to a reviewer, only a very few
points were chosen out of the wealth of problems so brilliantly and provocatively
investigated by Del Vecchio, one of the outstanding legal philosophers of our
time. Any reader ean, like this reviewer, pick out a few points here and there
the treatment of which stimulated, as the whole content of the book, his special
curiosity but left him still not completely convinced.
II
The other book does not deal with such a large subject as the first one.
Its content turns on a particular problem of legislative interpretation. Judge
1. The author defines positive law as the system of law which regulates the
life of a people at the particular time. His illustrations of non-positive law such
as a pending bill or a law which had been repealed are not convincing. (p. 305).
They lack among other things "coercibility" that is an elemental quality "which
is proper to law alone." (p. 279).'
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Felix Forte, to whom we are indebted for the translation, mentions in his forward
that Dean Roscoe Pound had suggested that the book be translated from Italian to
English. We have to be grateful for the suggestion and for the compliance therewith.
In his introduction Dean Pound calls Dr. Del Vecchio a leader of the right
wing of the Neo-Kantians because within that group of noted philosophers whose
doctrines are based on Kant's idealistic theory of knowledge, Del Vecchio "turned
to a moral criticism allied to the traditional theory in giving us a natural law." But.
we may ask, what is Del Vecchio's natural law?
Dr. Del Vecchio's point of departure is in the direction given in a few civil
codes to the dispensers of justice to decide the case according to the "principles
of natural justice" or "the general principles of law." However, the resort to these
methods can be had only, as the codes demand, after the methods of literal and
logical interpretation and the recourse to statutory analogy have not led to a
satisfactory determination of the case. It was the Austrian Civil Code of 1811,
sec. 7, which, in that way, referred to the principles of natural justice. Influenced
by this Code, Art. 3 of the former Italian Codice Civile of 1865 directed the
interpreter, in a.similar way, to decide the case after all the other ways of finding
a decision fail, according to "the general principles of law."
It is true that the draftsmen of the Austrian Code who had been brought up
with the doctrines of the great writers of natural law of the 17th and 18th
centuries, regarded the quoted words as a reference to those theories. They believed
that the natural law theories .of their knowledge presented a "Code of Reason"
which is of universal significance. However, the true meaning of that reference
to "principles of natural justice" cannot be taken from those doctrines. The "law
in action," to use Roscoe Pound's excellent term, that is, the unanimous interpretation by the jurists of the code, should tell us what the rule means. The Austrian
jurists have considered the above mentioned direction of sec. 72 as an authorization
for the interpreter to decide the case according to what the lawgiver would have
laid down as a rule if such a case had occurred to his mind.3 This does not mean
that the interpreter is given the role of lawmaker. It does mean that he has to
proceed in accordance with the whole spirit of the Code, that is in accordance
with the general principles underlying the codification. 4
However, the author believes that the reference to general principles of law
means "a reference to the supreme truth of law in general, that is, a reference to
2. For the wording of sec. 7 and its interpretation, reference may be made

to this reviewer's study On Interpretative Theories: A Comparative Study in
Legislation, 27 Texas L. Rev. 312 (1949), particularly pp. 316-319.
3. See Pisko in 1 Kafigs's Kommenter zum Allgemeinen Burgerlichen
Gesetzbuch, Civil Code 147 (1st ed. 1933).

4. It is characteristic that the present Italian Code of 1942, Art. 12, speaks

"of general principles of the legal order of the State." (Emphasis added.) Doctor
Del Vecchio arguing in the whole book for a natural-law interpretation, is
therefore, not pleased with the wording of Art. 12. See p. 7, at note 3.
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those logical and ethical elements in the law which are common to virtually all
peoples because they are both rational and human."
If a case has to be decided by the International Court of Justice, the author's
view would have an indisputable basis. Article 38(1) (c) of the present Statute
regarding the Court provides that subsidiarily the Court has to resort to the "general
principles of law recognized by the civilized nations." This reference has been
taken over verbatim from the Statute (sec. 38) of 1920 concerning the Permanent
Court of International Justice. However, I did not find any reference to this
Statute in the book and I would suggest that the next edition should include a
discussion of that interesting provision.
A sharp distinction nevertheless must be drawn between that approach of
Del Vecchio to a natural law and those doctrines which proceed upon the idea
of a transcendental natural law. As I see it, the concept of "natural law" is for
the author synonymous with "general doctrines of the law, which are dominant
in the thought of a certain time." (p. 34). These general doctrines "correspond
to a truly scientific tradition" and "are intimately connected with the very genesis
of the laws in force." (Emphasis added.) This approach to natural law may be
seen also from his description of the essential elements of the natural law
theories in Chapter V of the book. According to the author the essential elements
are "equal liberty," or "juridical equality" on the one hand and, on the other,
"limitations of personal rights only by law." These are conceptions which had
been significantly formulated by Locke. Similarly, the author's reference to the
"general will," which means for him the "rational necessity" for basing the idea
of government on the consent of the governed, that is, the author's conception of
the "social contract" as the basis for a government of law, goes back to Locke.
Dr. Del Vecchio identifies correctly such an idea of government with the conception of the Rechtsstaat or, in Judge Forte's translation, the Law-State. This conception has primarily been used by the German representatives of liberalism in the
second and third quarters of the nineteenth century. It goes back to the natural
law theories of the eighteenth century. The conception points to the limitation
placed upon government by law which has to be binding equally upon citizens
and government.
These fundamental ideas are certainly reflected in the present legal systems
of the western world. One will, therefore, heartily agree with Del Vecchio's
expression that these doctrines "have penetrated substantially our positive legislation." (Emphasis added.)
In this connection mention must also be made of the author's remarks on the
limits placed upon the application of analogy and of the general principles of law.
This is, as he puts it in terms derived from the idea of a government limited by
rules of law, or, as the book calls it, of the "law-state":

BOOK REVIEW
"Where the problem of individual versus public rights is not involved,
the law, though remaining inviolable, allows itself to be superseded, or
better integrated by recourse not only to analogy but also to the general
principles of law."
One must not overlook that whenever the author out of his great wealth of
ideas feels the necessity to rest his reasoning upon positive rules, he takes them
from his national (Italian) law. As most of the European legal systems, so is the
Italian one based on legislation, the codes. For the purposes of this book, the
author referred particularly to the introductory part of the Italian Civil Code of
1865, which dealt with "the application of the (statutory) rules in general."'5
Article 4 of this part of the Code of 1865 prohibited the application of rules
pertaining to "penal law" or of those laws which "restrict the free exercise of
rights,' to cases which are not expressly embraced by those rules and laws.
According to the author this prohibition points to all the laws which imply acts
of administrative agencies. Consequently, the prohibition denies government the
power to limit the liberty of individuals except in cases expressly covered by law.
To say this is to accentuate the word "expressly." There is, of course, deeply
imbedded in our system of the law the idea that, to quote from Chief Justice John
Marshall, "it is the legislature, not the court, which is to define a crime, and ordain
its punishment."7
However, aside from this limitation, legal analogy was the force which
created the bulk of our common law, and the common law, also in this regard,
has not drawn a dividing line between private and public law..
It has also been in the field of public law, a field growing in significance
from decade to decade, that our courts have looked at the directional character of
general principles of law. To illustrate: when in recent years a question of racial
discrimination practiced by a railroad brotherhood reached the Supreme Court, the
Court directed the issuance of an injunction against the enforcement of a
discriminatory collective agreement. The Court derived its conclusion that the
power of the brotherhood is limited so as to forbid any discrimination against any
members of the Craft, from a principle of general application. Said the Court, 'The
representative is clothed with power not unlike that of a legislature which is
subject to constitutional limitations on its power to discriminate against the
rights of those for whom it legislates."s
5. Also this part of the Code has been supplanted in 1942 by another one.
See note 4 supra.
6. The present Italian Statute of 1942 excludes the resort to analogy only
as to penal statutes and as to those regulative acts which provide for exceptions
from general rules. Let us recall, however, that, as mentioned elsewhere in this
review, ultimate resort can be had only to general principles of the Italian legal
system.
7. United States v. Wiltberger,5 Wheat. 76, 95-6 (U.S. 1820).
8. Steele v. Louisville and Nashville Railway Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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If the reader of this review should receive the impression that the courts
have held that an ultimate resort to the general principles of law is only justified
where the protection of the individual from a violation of his interests by the
holder- of power is at issue, the impression would be false. Not statutory provision,
but holdings based on general principles have led the courts to deny an individual
protection against public authorities in situations in which he would enjoy such
a protection with respect to dealings with other private individuals or corporations
Again an example: the government Ixs been held not to be estopped from
denying the binding effect of actions taken by its officers or agents, in the same
situations, a private party, for instance an insurance company, would have been
barred from such a denial by the theory of estoppel. 9
Thus, it bespeaks the liveliness of the discussion in Del Vecchio's great
contribution to jurisprudence that it invites the reader to comparative considerations.
The author is well aware of the significance of other factors than the pure
legal rules, for the decision of a case. He quotes from the well-known work of the
noted Italian scholar Vivante on commercial law: "The nature of the facts
although not manifest either in a law or custom, may constitute in itself a source
of law and direct the decision of the judges." Dr. Del Vecchio describes this
weighing of the individual fact situation, which determines the equilibrium in the
relation between the parties, as the process of equity in the broad sense (I would
say in the Aristotelian sense). It is nothing else than a process of evaluation of the
particular fact situation. And one may add that it is an evaluation which takes its
clues from the actual feelings and demands of the community, as Oliver Wendell
Holmes put it. It might be a question of semantics to give such societally and
traditionally inspired considerations the name of natural law. For me it has
rather the touch of juristic realism.
Jurisprudence owes Dr. Del Vecchio a great debt. Admirably free from any
bias or predilection,, a genuine philosopher has in these two books as in all his
former works, made lasting contributions to jurisprudence. It is his firm belief
that "the particularity of laws compels consideration of the universal of law in
general, and that consideration of the universal is philosophy." All readers of
these books will heartily subscribe to these words.
ARTHUR LENHOFF

Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus.
University of Buffalo School of Law
Visiting Professor of Law
Rutgers University School of Law
9. See e.g., Fder, Crop Ins; v. Merril, 332 U.S. 380 (1948).

